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 1 INTRODUCTION
Corporate strategy means establishing criteria by which a firm chooses the market
segment it will serve, that is, where and how the firm will compete (Grant, 1991:36).
Basically, there are two alternative philosophies to design strategic criteria for
commercial banks or any other type of firm  (Mason, 1979: 111-6). The first is a
forecasting effort, in which the bank establishes its competitive potential, and then the
managers develop this course of action as much as the environment allows. This first
approach considers growth opportunities internally determined.
According to the second philosophy, the bank's managers recognize the available types
of growth opportunities then pursue them. This approach considers that growth
opportunities are basically external to banks. This is also the criteria assumed by most
economic analysis.
In view that this essay reviews the most significant theoretical and empirical
contributions in economics analysis, to assess the changes regulation-policy causes on
commercial banks' strategies, it is further assumed that all relevant growth
opportunities to banks are externally driven, that is, successful regulation policy creates
a positive excess demand for the services of financial intermediaries.
On the other hand, the reader will find that policy-makers change banks’ legal
framework  based on macroeconomic variables, trying to increase banks' technical
efficiency. In turn, these decisions do not necessarily imply a unique stimulus for banks
and, hence, the development of diverse strategic responses.
The discussion claims those differences in technical efficiency result in unequal market
shares. Claim sustained through the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP):
an approach concerned not with firms' characteristics but with the features that
condition industry behavior. Three basic hypotheses constitute SCP and the discussion
centers in one of them or that known as the full structuralist hypothesis. Its main
elements and two of the proposals embedded in it will be illustrated: segmentation
analysis (strategic groups) and Market Contestability Theory (CMT). Strategic groups
are disregarded as a short-run approach, unsuitable for markets in disequilibrium. The
analysis of the Mexican case explains how CMT is adequate to devise international
banks' corporate strategy.2
The essay also presents an account of how CMT handles above normal prices, due to
entry barriers or entry costs. How it’s unconcerned with questions of market share or
the suitability of the number of competitors. How CMT focuses on strategic
interactions of firms, available technology, financial characteristics and product
demand features. The essay also illustrates the importance of entry deterrence and
inter-industry mobility to CMT. A partial conclusion is that adequate empirical
assessment is a mayor problem for CMT. One of the most important criticisms, to this
respect, points out that absence of correlation between prices and market power only
falsifies perfect contestability. While, at the same time, little can be said about the
sources of the imperfection.
The essay also reviews the most recent studies that analyze the Mexican banking
system. It demonstrates how the discussion of that industry's structure progressed in
terms of banks' price performance (as measured by financial margins, commission
income and profitability).  However,  these studies deal improperly with the relevant
elements concerning entry deterrence. Two specific and very important unresolved
problems are establishing the efficiency of policy reform to a) speed entry and b)
encourage market growth.
In brief, section 2 begins the discussion by introducing a small model of financial
intermediation and economic development.  This approach  underlines the link between
financial services' demand and economic growth. The discussion centers around the
model's microeconomic characteristics, with the purpose of illustrating the dynamics of
the industry's contestability when the market grows. Section 3 reviews the some
theoretical alternatives (within Economics) to build banks’ corporate strategy. Section
4 details the characteristics of Contestable Markets Theory. Section 5 illustrates the
current state of the later theory in the case of the Mexican banking system. Section 6
summarizes the areas most needed of attention. It recommends that the ideal empirical
transfer function should allow the assessment of financial statements through panel-
data estimation. However, the size of the Mexican market hampers the success of any
econometric study of long-term behavior. A research design using case-studies based
on contingency theory (that is, financial options) serves that goal better.
2  FRAME OF REFERENCE
This section argues how policy makers base their decisions to instrument regulation
policy of financial markets on macroeconomic phenomena while trying to modify
microeconomic behavior. First, a demand side, one period, closed economy approach3
shows how financial intermediation dissuades consumption decisions and aggregate
economic growth. This feature suggests that banking is costly to society.
The second part of the discussion presents a formal macroeconomic, supply side
approach to illustrate how the social costs of financial intermediation have been dealt
with in literature. The conclusion is that the instruments of regulation policy in
financial markets seek, ceteris paribus, the stimulus of long-term economic growth
through greater technical efficiency in banking.
For the fist approach, assume a typical agent facing the decision between consuming a
basket of goods  today (c1) or tomorrow (c2). In this world production is costless so
consumption and investment are simultaneous. For example, if the basket is made up of
wheat, corn and barley, deciding how much to farm equals the amounts of bread,
"tortillas" and beer to be produced. Lets call "r" the rate of intertemporal consumption
or that used to discount c2, because total consumption (C) is the sum of c1 plus the
present value of c2. Note that "r" is  a real rate since there is certainty and barter (no
money). We can further define a preference curve (U) or those combinations of c1 and
c2/(1+r) that give the agent the same level of satisfaction. See figure 1. The drawing
assumes the preference map is dense so agents' decisions are set by their budget
constraint i.e. income is equal to the value of today's consumption (p1*c1) plus the
present value of tomorrow's (p2*c2/1+r). Point E shows the equilibrium in
consumption or those amounts of goods where today's consumption equals the present
value of tomorrow's.
[Insert figure 1]
When there is no longer a typical agent, some people will prefer to consume or invest
more today than tomorrow (E-c1 < 0). Under this condition, long run (steady state)
equilibrium occurs if savers (those who prefer tomorrow’s consumption) supply the
resources needed by consumers and investors.
Another assumption that could be relaxed is that of certainty. Asymmetric information
brings about the need for an intermediary that assures savers that their loans will be
serviced. This service-oriented agent, called bank, can also help to cope with inflation
by introducing in "r" the general and sustained growth of prices. Then when banks
raise rate "r", which now considers both default-risk and inflation, the decision
between consumption and investment is no longer costless because investment
decisions are at risk of not producing returns that pay-off loans. Without an4
intermediary no-one borrows and all production is consumed in the same period
(autarky point E).
Note how in this simple world the relationships between investors/consumers, savers
and banks have a direct link with economic development, because risk (production
shocks or asymmetric information) hamper savers' willingness to lend and increase
available goods for production. In literature, those contributions that deal with these
relationships are known as "financial intermediation and growth models". Some
compendia are Gertler (1988),  Hellwig (1991), Pagano  (1993) and Bhattacharya-
Thakor (1993).
The remaining arguments demonstrate how together the models of Pagano (1993) and
Hannan (1991b) achieve a simple -yet elegant- understanding of the supply-side
process of endogenous growth with financial intermediation.  In this model the
presence of banks reduces the amount of available savings. At the same time, society
needs banks because they allow the diversification of depositors’ investment portfolio
(Hellwig, 1991:42; and Vives, 1991:9,11). This model illustrates how greater technical
efficiency in financial intermediation stimulates economic growth.
Pagano's (1993:614) model establishes the potential elements through which financial
intermediation influences development. This proposal assumes a closed economy
where aggregate production is a lineal function of the capital stock (the AK model),
Yt = AKt (1)
This algorithm of endogenous growth is a reduced form of assuming perfect
competition and external economies.  In this reduced form each firm has a technology
characterized by constant returns to scale. In this world, productivity is an increasing
function of the capital stock. Alternatively, assuming that the capital stock represents
the sum of physical and human investments achieves the same result.
For the sake of simplicity, constant demographic growth is assumed. Only one good is
produced. The consumption/investment decision is, again, costless but the good
depreciates at a rate d. Then, aggregate investment (I) is
It =  Kt+1 - (1 - d)Kt (2)5
Total savings (Xt) should be equal to aggregate investment in order to reach capital
market equilibrium. However, allowing  (1-Q) resources to be used by the process of
financial intermediation sets the equilibrium of the capital market to
QXt =  It (3)
Now, the aggregate rate of growth of production can be obtained from equation 1
gt+1 = Yt+1 /  Yt-1  =  Kt+1 /  Kt-1 (4)
where, after omitting the sub-indexes, representing the rate of private savings (X/Y) by
s and substituting the capital market equilibrium condition (equation 3), the rate of
growth for long-run equilibrium for Pagano’s (1993) model is
g = A (I/Y) - d = AQs - d (5)
Equation 5 shows how the financial system influences the rate of growth through the
proportion of saving dedicated to investment, marginal productivity of capital (A) or
the rate s.
[Insert figure 2]
For Pagano’s (1993) model greater technical efficiency in banking will spur growth.
This is possible thanks to two conditions. First, all financial products are vehicles to
allocate savings into productive investment. Second, only under perfect competition
will (1-Q) represent the minimum cost of financial intermediation. The removal of
classical assumptions brings inefficiencies such as management effectiveness, market
power, taxation, regulation,  et cetera. In brief, the model suggests that the degree of
bank's technical efficiency influences the economy's rate of growth significantly. To
that effect Pagano (1993:617-8) notes the ambiguity of available empirical results.
Pagano (1993) follows the Gurley-Shaw (1960) approach to financial intermediation.
This strand claims that banks exist because direct trade of loanable funds cannot
achieve financial economies (i.e. individuals show little diversification). The increase in
transaction costs means that the presence of financial intermediaries (i.e. 1-Q) is
compensated  by diversified loan portfolios (financial economies). This viewpoint,
then, argues that financial intermediation chiefly performs a liquidity function for the
economy (See further Mullineux, 1993 for a discussion of J.M. Keynes' money demand
and financial innovation).6
A different approach to justify the existence and effects of intermediaries is taken by
Jensen-Macklin (1976) or Diamond (1984). For them agents exist to reduce moral
hazard and asymmetric information (see also Leland-Pyle, 1977). This is possible
thanks to economies of scale in supervision and by aligning incentives. These
contributions highlight the credit-allocation features of banking.
Both stances defend that banking will reduce social welfare but at the same time, and
contrary to McKinnon's (1973) or Fama's (1980) positions, both approaches sustain
that financial intermediation is a necessary condition for development. Both viewpoints
consider financial intermediation exists even after assuming perfect competition in all
markets.  Therefore, the lesson from this discussion is not the neutrality of banking for
economic growth, but whether its benefits are greater than its social costs.
Once the social cost of financial intermediation is justified, the debate turns to the
explanation of what will happen when the economy grows. Gurley-Shaw (1960) argue
that the financial system will become more efficient.  Banks have an incentive to reduce
costs as new and more specialized institutions develop. The latter process is called
"financial deepening" and explains why industrialized economies have "mature"
financial markets or  because the disposition of agents to spend more resources in
finance related activities.
Taking the arguments of  Jensen-Mackling-Diamond to the extreme, they result in only
one financial intermediary: one big universal bank, capable of supplying all services.
This is so because diminishing transaction costs and market failures impinge an ever
smaller distance between intermediary and client. Institutions replace the "invisible
hand" when markets fail. This approach builds on the assumption that the financial
markets are not perfect; hence, the need for intermediaries.
As mentioned, the empirical studies of both propositions concern themselves with
estimating the macroeconomic consequences of financial intermediation (an interesting
example is Obstfeld, 1994). Therefore, this debate will continue as long as there is no
method to estimate social welfare losses satisfactorily. Even more, while a fair way to
determine the demand for banking services remains unavailable (see Cohen-Levin,
1989:1079-82).
On the other hand,  the type of model under discussion improves the analysis of
microeconomic phenomena (banks' strategies). This is in line with various theories that7
assess the effects of banks' efficiency through capital markets. One of such
approximations is Hannan (1991b). By joining Hannan (1991b) and Pagano (1993) a
design denominated PH results. The PH model claims to trace the macroeconomic
consequences of microeconomic behavior. Specifically, Hannan's (1991b) results under
Pagano's (1993) macroeconomic assumptions suggest that the technical efficiency of
financial intermediaries has direct and immediate consequences on the long-term rate
of growth of the economy (see also Bátiz, 1994).
Hannan (1991b) aims at testing two hypotheses under the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm: the full structuralist (named "structure-efficiency" or
"relative efficiency") versus the classical hypothesis (called "performance-structure").
For this approach both hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: it is an empirical
question which one will dominate the industry; even though the non-industry character
dominates some segment.
The following section develops SCP and its full implications with great detail.
Meanwhile let us review Hannan's model further. For Hannan (1991b) a commercial
bank receives deposits. Along with the bank’s capital, the latter will be distributed
through several investment possibilities. The resulting return to the portfolio’s
investment will be
p =  S((rl - cl)Ln) + (rs - cs)S - S((rd - cd)Dm) - C (6)
where
  ri Interest rate.
ci Variable non-interest cost per monetary unit.
Ln Amount of nth category of loanable funds .
S Total amount of other securities.
Dm Amount of the mth category of deposits.
C Fixed costs.
By adding the costs of the w banks that make up the financial system, equation 2 is
redefined as
Q = 1 - ( S (clw + csw(1+Sw) + cdw + Cw) / Y )   (7)
Equation (7) achieves the relationship between the efficiency of the financial
intermediaries and the distribution of available investment funds through the economy.8
Taken together equations (6) and (7) portrait financial agents as those capable of
achieving diversified portfolios from credits and deposits with different maturities, that
is, financial economies of scale.  Under the Gurley-Shaw (1960) approach this feature
(socially) justifies the increased distance between borrowers and suppliers of loanable
funds.
The PH design also makes it possible to foresee, at micro and macro levels, the effect
of introducing different types of imperfections. For example, equation (7) shows that a
bank subsidy, that increases government debt (Sw) by equal amount, might have non or
even negative effects on economic growth. Note, however, that even though equation
(6) allows it the current specification does not envision spatial diversification.
The mayor problem for a direct empirical assessment of equation (7) is that banks only
publish aggregate information of their transactions (accounting reports). Even more,
Neven (1990) points out the risks of using banking prices (deregulated interest rates)
as proxy for market activity. Banks' financial margins (prices) answer to differences in
scale economies, price discrimination across products and management inefficiencies.
Actually, one conclusion shared by Neven (1990) and Vives (1991) is that banks,
especially retail banks, do not compete in price but in service quality (Cournot
competition). Moreover that deposit insurance schemes (or equivalent government
intervention) diminish the incentives to meet consumer needs at provision costs
(allocative efficiency). Therefore, it is the task of the next section to illustrate
alternative roads to approach the relationship in equation (7). Also, it will illustrate in
greater detail how this question is embedded in the debate of concentration vs.
technical efficiency in banking.
In the mean time, the current section has demonstrated that regulators build policy
upon macroeconomic phenomena (equation 2) trying to affect microeconomic
behavior (equation 7). Even more, under the traditional assumptions of neo-classical
economics  successful regulation policy will result in lower levels of equation (7) by
increasing the efficiency of incumbents, by introducing new (more efficient) players or
through both. Effective regulation policy, then, produces an incentive to enter financial
markets (external growth opportunities to banks). The whole discussion between the
above mentioned SCP-hypotheses is whether regime changes produce the desired
effect on agents strategic behavior.
3 COMPETING HYPOTHESES9
The literature compendium of Bhattacharya-Thakor (1993:5,41-2) states that one of
the unsettled questions in contemporary banking theory is understanding the system's
optimal design (structure). However adequate the claim may be, this study lacks a
survey of the literature dealing with the effects of concentration in banking (idem,
p.41). The surveys of Gilbert (1984), Geroski (1988) or Schmalensee (1989) review
the question of concentration in greater depth and, in principle, come to the same
conclusion. In particular, how must the policy maker establish an adequate degree of
concentration to achieve a dual goal: to incentive competition and rivalry between
banks while not increasing the risk of a "bank run". The puzzle's solution is further
hampered because any equilibrium in the banking system is, necessarily, a second best
solution: depositors are not investors, therefore, they need to be protected
(Schmalensee, 1982:26; Neven, 1990:163; Solís-Trigueros, 1991:98; Vives, 1991:16;
Gavito-Sánchez-Trigueros, 1992:227-30; among others). This subject marks the very
fragile boundary between the micro and macro-economic analysis of banking. It also
implies that the usual policy option regarding a bank merger is a move towards perfect
competition, not all the way to perfect competition.
The design of an optimal banking structure dates back to 1960 when, by a ruling of the
Supreme Court, US government agencies had to consider the anti-trust effects of
mergers in banking. Two major theoretical approaches developed: oligopolistic models
and the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP). See figure 3. In this debate,
oligopolistic models consist of algorithms that deal with the analysis of rivals, their
expectations and probable behavior. The most noteworthy contributions are Game
Theory and Spatial Competition models. An example of the former is Matues-Vives
(1994). However, Spatial Competition analysis seems to be a more popular approach.
Examples of the latter are Besanko-Thakor (1992); Fuenteslsaz-Salas (1992a,b)  and
Matues-Padilla (1993). However, Grant (1991:63) claims that, in terms of strategic
planning,  Game Theory solutions have not developed either the generality or the
sophistication to enable realistic modeling.  At the same time, the solutions of Spatial
Competition models indicate that their relative importance is dealing with very specific
microeconomic problems, but not with multi-product and/or time-varying
specifications (even though some current contributions like Besanko-Thakor, 1992  or
Matutes-Padilla, 1994;  attempt to break-away from this criticism).
[Insert figure 3]
Bain's structuralist hypothesis finds itself on the other side of the debate. The
"classical" assumption of SCP, originally proposed by Bain (1951),  holds that the10
sources of market inefficiency (both allocative and technical) are likely to appear in
highly concentrated structures. Therefore, industries with a "good" performance (low
inefficiency or prices equal to economic costs) will be those with a "great" number of
firms. SCP simplifies the anti-trust authorities' job by limiting it to examine industries
with "few" players. However, the empirical findings of the latter theory did not manage
to deliver the expected results. They became an incentive for the development of other
theories and, thus, increased the anti-trust policy debate to a multi-theoretical-position
party of contributors.
On the other hand, the SCP paradigm turned researchers' attention away from firms'
internal factors and towards stable and exogenous market features. It's thought that
this features condition industry members' behavior (see Geroski, 1988 or Schmalensee,
1989). Three alternative approaches blossomed from Bain's original proposal. The first
is called critical concentration level hypothesis. It focuses on the concentration degree
where average profits are above normal economic profits.
The second or appropriate concentration measure hypothesis attempts to find a
suitable index for anti-trust intervention. However, there is little evidence to suggest a
linear association between profits (performance) and concentration (Gilbert,
1984:635).
The third approach or full structuralist hypothesis recognizes that market structure is a
complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, inadequately described by concentration
indexes. The full structuralist hypothesis claims that the use of such measures is
problematic to assess performance because concentration indexes are defined in terms
of current output. Even more, the full structuralist hypothesis considers that
concentration and performance are simultaneously determined.
Banks’ corporate strategy must disregard the first two hypotheses, because their
theoretical formulations ignore the effects of regulation. On the contrary, the full
structuralist hypothesis does consider it. This approach also holds that the constitutive
elements of market structure are interdependent and that, in the short-term, industries
can benefit from lesser concentration. It also allows the analysis to include special
features of banking such as deposit insurance or lender of last resort, that is, schemes
that prevent full technical efficiency (see further Baltensberger-Dermine, 1987:70;
Neven, 1990:159-64; Vives, 1991:18; Gavito-Sánchez-Trigueros, 1992:230-1; Grifell-
Prior-Salas, 1992:5; among others).11
This essay, then, reviews in greater detail two proposals based on the full structuralist
hypothesis. These are segmentation analysis and Contestable Markets Theory (CMT).
The purpose is to assess which framework is best suited to design banks' corporate
strategy.
Porter's (1980:134-5) segmentation analysis (i.e. strategic groups) has plenty of value
to describe competition amongst participants. This approach is chiefly worried with
establishing how and by which means positions of dominance are achieved.  Studies
based on this methodology have been applied to banking to assess the competitive
process during a major policy change.
For instance, a first attempt to detect strategic groups in international banking in light
of the Single European Market (between 1988 and 1991) is the study of García Pont-
Lessard (1994) which, by the way, follows the methodology of Nohria-García Pont
(1991).
However, up to now Porter (1980:135) and his followers have not given a full account
of how strategic groups are formed. The analysis also lacks a mechanism to estimate
the duration of any arrangement. Other criticism to this approach concerns itself with
the assumption of an endogenous and time invariant market structure (Grant,
1991:62,70). Furthermore, most of its data sources are not, and will never be,
accessible (let alone public). For example, García Pont-Lessard (1994:10,22) remarks
over the difficulties of information gathering: Given that our coverage was limited to
English-speaking sources, and that, particularly in the financial sector, not all
linkages are made public, it is quite difficult to know whether all the established
linkages are included in the data set.
Even more, the strategic-group approach is inconsistent with empirical findings
regarding new establishments in growing markets (see Porter, 1980:134 vs.
Schmalensee, 1989:997).  Perhaps this inconsistency rises because it is a short-run
approach and it sticks to the classical SCP hypothesis as the main determinant of
performance (as suggested in Porter, 1980:138).
In brief, segmentation analysis is not suitable for markets in disequilibrium. Such is the
case of banking after successful regulation policy.  Nonetheless, this approach seems
adequate for relatively stable industries.
4 THE THEORY OF CONTESTABLE MARKETS12
A theoretical alternative to segmentation analysis, based on the full structuralist
hypothesis, is an approach centered on the structural barriers that enable a profitable
position to be persistently maintained. As mentioned above, the theory chosen is that
of Contestable Markets (CMT). This theory places the burden of regulation
performance on the possibility of entry. It overcomes the problems of designing
simplified approaches when dealing with second-best solutions. Also, it considers that
today's firms are multi-product establishments and that industry structure is determined
explicitly, endogenously, and simultaneously with the pricing, output, and other
decisions of the constituent firms. Moreover, it allows a multi-period analysis of
structure and gives a lot of importance to the presence of economies of scale and of
scope (see  Baumol, 1982:3; Schmalensee, 1989:27;  Gilbert, 1984:628; and Geroski,
1988:185).
The CMT method proceeds in two steps (Baumol, 1982 or Baumol-Willig, 1986).
First, it determines the most efficient industry structure for the production of an output
vector. This by establishing the cost function of a typical firm (minimum efficient
scale), and then calculating how many similar establishments will be necessary to
produce a given output. The second step investigates which market pressures will lead
towards such efficient structure.
From CMT's viewpoint, the design of banks' corporate strategy evaluates the
effectiveness of  policy changes in two steps. First, an assessment of potential
(external) growth opportunities and, second, a capital budgeting exercise that
determines the optimal size of the new establishment and/or bank asset growth.
On the other hand, when compared with segmentation analysis CMT offers a straight-
forward estimation of market entry and its exogenous determinants. Contrary to other
SCP hypotheses, CMT rejects applying concentration measures across industries
(inter-industry studies). CMT recognizes that the association between concentration
and performance (market power or monopoly rents) is subject to ambiguities. Also that
such inconsistency is, for empirical assessment purposes, further aggravated by the use
of pools of average profits. Finally, CMT favors analyzing what is happening within an
industry i.e. how monopoly rents are distributed among incumbents (intra-industry
analysis).
CMT synthesizes a series of contributions that allow competitive equilibria through
small numbers of firms (Baumol-Panzar-Willig, 1982). This notion is contrary to that
orthodox economic theory, which holds that such equilibrium is achieved because firms13
maximize prices, each producer is relatively small, transaction costs and asymmetric
information are non-existent. CMT argues that the traditional reasoning does not
necessarily hold at all times. This is demonstrated by assuming that decision makers do
exist and by focusing on the nature and characteristics of the decisions taken
(corporate strategy). Specifically, on how firms' interactions affect the ease of entry
and exit. For example, CMT is based on the notion that when structural barriers to
enter a market (formerly dominated by a monopolistic arrangement) are removed, a
new establishment will be built as long a the current price offers profitable
opportunities (for instance see Gilbert-Newberry, 1992). This means that entrants
make their decisions based on the pre-entry market price, hoping incumbents react
slow enough to allow their investment recuperation (or exit the market without loss).
These claims imply that prices are influenced by the expectations of incumbents and
potential entrants. Therefore, incumbents must set prices at competitive levels in order
to deter entry. In this way, CMT is a theory describing the process of competition
where orthodoxy deals with its outcome. Even more, it is a theory focused on the
relative level of prices and on the existence of profitable opportunities. Hence, ideally
suited for corporate strategy.
The key concept for CMT is the "threat of entry": prices are sustainable only if it is
financially impossible for entrants to profit after covering the cost of entry. Therefore,
it no longer matters how many firms there are in a market. At the extreme, when entry
and exit are costless perfectly contestable markets reach the same results as markets
under perfect competition. However, perfectly contestable markets are an ideal state
and the degree of contestability is defined by the "amount" of entry deterrence.
A very interesting example of how to study entry deterrence is found in the Mexican
banking system because after several years of protection it has been recently opened to
foreign competition. Initially entrance was subject to a percentage of market growth
and limited ownership of incumbents. Eventually, restrictions were lifted but, as
mentioned above, this is not sufficient to assure the market is contestable. Therefore,
from this point on the discussion will center on entry deterrence and illustrate the
concepts through the case of the Mexican banking system.
The notion of entry deterrence rests upon two basic concepts:
1. ENTRY COSTS .-   Potential entrants face costs greater than those incurred by
an incumbent. Some examples are "sunk" (irrecoverable) costs, technology,14
economies of scale, economies of scope, or financial power. Figure 4 shows the
case for Mexican banking.
[Insert figure 4]
2. ENTRY BARRIERS .- An impediment to the flow of resources into the industry.
They arise as a result of socially excessive protection of incumbent firms.
Therefore, this theory assumes that collusive arrangements can only be sustained
through regulation. Otherwise, in the absence of social protection (or entry costs)
monopoly power would be eroded by entry. Note that following Porter
(1980:134-5) or Grant (1991:79) this analysis would be applied to segments of
the same industry (more detail in  Porter, 1979). See figure 5 for an illustration.
[Insert figure 5]
These two concepts are the basis for CMT's policy suggestions and regulation policy
assessment. For example, because banks compete mostly in service quality and not in
price, a common measure of structure and performance-quality is the number of
persons per branch (Neven, 1990:161-3). In the case of the Mexican system, some
consider that the over-all branch web is small but, at the same time, high when
controlling for the number of banks (Solís-Trigueros, 1991:94). For others, the
growing number of branches built after re-privatization is justified in terms of
international standards: 18,000 vs. 4,100 persons per branch, respectively, in Mexico
and Europe (Gavito-Trigueros, 1994:205). To establish if the branch web is a barrier
to entry in retail banking the most successful approaches have been models of Spatial
Competition (some worthy examples are Matues-Padilla, 1994; Besanko-Thakor,
1992; Fuenteslsaz-Salas,1992a,b). However, the reader will remember this algorithms
have been disregarded to establish long-term corporate strategy in banking. At the
same time, recent developments in technology (telephone-banking, for example) have
effectively turned branch networks from entry barrier to sunk-strategic costs or a
burden for incumbent banks (see further Neven 1990:168 and Dermine 1991:33).
On the other hand, for CMT rational government intervention aims at impinging
competitive prices in industries where monopoly power is present, just as if
competitive pressures were available. To achieve such behavior regulation is
redesigned to produce an effective threat of entry. In order to have a successful
measure CMT recommends the policy maker to reduce entry barriers and/or costs.
From this point on, CMT opens the debate regarding which, intervention or market15
forces, will be more effective to reduce price abnormalities. Government intervention is
proven unnecessary when the existing barriers or costs are sufficiently low or
diminishing at an adequate speed, even though a market might be characterized by one
firm! In terms of corporate strategy, this means that CMT's approach provides a guide
for selecting those industries where profitable opportunities exist even though many
firms are present, regulation policy has not proven effective or the speed of adjustment
is too low. For the case of international banking strategy, recent events in Mexico
provide an incentive to entry if the before mentioned conditions have been met. It is
the task of the in coming section to provide such assessment while, at the same time,
illustrate some of the most common techniques to determine an industry's
contestability.
In sum, this section briefly explains how CMT handles above normal prices, due to
entry barriers or entry costs. How it is not primarily concerned with questions of
market share or competitor number suitability. How CMT focuses on strategic
interactions of firms, available technology, financial characteristics and product
demand features. The following section shows, for financial services, how CMT
considers entry deterrence and inter-industry mobility. In the following section we will
apply the concepts  discussed  so far to the case of the Mexican banking system.
5 STUDIES OF MEXICAN BANKING EFFICIENCY
5.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN MEXICAN BANKING  (1988-1994)
This section presents the major changes in the competitive environment of Mexican
banks as a preface to the empirical discussion. Throughout it, the terms banking,
banking industry, financial system, etc. refer to the situation faced by Mexican
commercial banks, one of the several intermediaries serving the Mexican economy (for
detail see Solís-Trigueros, 1991:91).
Our history of that industry begins in the last decade. During the 1980's the Mexican
government required funds that forced the private sector out of the domestic credit
market. This stimulated the  growth of an informal financial market which undermined
the usefulness of monetary policy as a tool of economic management (EIU,1993).
Thus, in October 1988 authorities began a regulation policy program to increase banks'
efficiency and allow them to compete with other intermediaries (mainly with stock
brokers). These measures also complemented a broad economic reform (that sought to
reduce the role of the state in the economy) and a stabilization program (which
pursued lower inflation and higher per capita income).16
The financial reform process had four stages. It tried to correct the uneven
development of intermediaries and to increase banks' human and physical capital.
Among other features, the program included central bank independence and regulation
of monetary aggregates through open market operations; complete freedom for
interest rate formulation; the replacement of the regulatory framework, which included
Constitutional amendments;  the creation of rules for agents to engage in "universal
banking" and the removal of all direct controls over credit. Also, the financial
restructuring of some, and the sale of all commercial banks to private investors; and
last but not least, a market liberalization schedule as part of a free trade agreement
with the US and Canada (Nafta).
In Mexico there were 50 private banks in 1982. After the nationalization they merged
until 18 were left. During this period Citibank and Banco Obrero (the  labor union
bank) remained the only private commercial banks. In other sources you might find
authors claiming  up to 64  banks being nationalized. This is so because the Presidential
Decree, of December 1 of 1982, also included those financial intermediaries that were
owned by the Mexican government. The reason being that President Lopez Portillo's
bold action modified the Constitution and created a new legal figure (know as
Sociedad Nacional de Crédito). Between June of 1991 and July of 1992 commercial
banks returned to private hands (for an event-study analysis see Alcérreca-
Theerathorn, 1994b).  Simultaneously to privatization, 23 "financial groups" were
created. This type of agent consists of at least 3 financial intermediaries. Of the
mentioned number, by the end of 1993, 16 had a bank, 6 a stock broker and 1 neither.
In 1993 "financial groups" controlled 97% of the whole financial system's total
resources, 94% of total deposits and 92% of total  securities in custody. In average
each participated in 6 of the 9 possible intermediation activities  - only 2 in all of them.
However, since the end of 1993 the number of firms has dramatically increased. At the
beginning of 1994, there were 2 petitions for "financial group" awaiting approval, 9
new bank permits issued and 4 on hold. During the Summer foreign firms followed the
procedures to fill up to 30.0% of the market. This was the last step in the official
process of regulation policy of the Mexican banking system. A process which began, as
above mentioned, in 1988 (see Ortíz Martínez, 1992, 1993; or EIU 1993).
As a result of Nafta's negotiations, the ceiling for individual foreing ownership was set
respectively to 1.5% and 4.0% of banks and stock brokers total industry equity capital.17
In October 1994 authorizations were granted, so foreigners opened 5 financial groups,
18 banks, 16 stock broker houses, and 12 insurance companies (O'Donoghue-Barbará
de Parres-Birnholz, 1994:19 and Fraser, 1994). This arrangement was expected to last
until the year 2004, with gradual adjustments according to market growth (as
measured by incumbents' equity capital). See figure 6. However, in January of 1995 the
Mexican government allowed foreign ownership to be up to 100% of banks' equity
capital.
In May 1995, Grupo Probursa (one of the two financial groups with presence in all
types of business) became the first Mexican subsidiary of a foreign financial institution.
The Spanish Banco Bilvao Vizcaya gained control of 70% of the equity capital after
the Mexican bank was severely damaged the local currency devaluation and bad debts.
[Insert Figure 6]
The forthcoming changes in the market structure of the Mexican banking system will
obey to the fact that, for the first time in its history, banks face stiff competition from
home and abroad. Under these conditions, what have Mexican banks done? How have
they responded to foreign threat? It is the subject of the rest of this  essay to take a
closer look at these issues and offer an approach for dealing effectively with them.
In summary, it has been implicitly claimed that three elements (structure, behavior,
performance) are the basis for corporate strategy. These concepts were used to analyze
the Mexican banking system's recent performance.  The following section discusses the
approaches to evaluate them. In general, the studies argue that the phenomena
currently observed in Mexico resemble the change in the legal environment of the
European Community (1985-1992) or the USA (1978-1981). Succinctly, these studies
try to interpret the European Process from a Mexican perspective, in order to provide
the basis for Nafta's negotiation and to estimate the agreement's benefits. However,
little to nothing is said regarding regulation policy effectiveness or about the speed of
adjustment to long-term equilibrium, that is, about the contestability of the Mexican
banking system.
5.2 PRE-NAFTA STUDIES
In 1987, 34% of banks' capital was floated in the Mexican Bolsa. Initially, the stock
could only be purchased by domestic agents. In May 2 of 1990, then President Salinas
announced the government's plans to sell its stake in commercial banks (for an event-18
study analysis see Alcérreca-Theerathorn, 1994a). The first reaction was for analysts to
assess the impact of six full years of government control (details in Banamex, 1990 or
Chávez, 1988).
Solís-Trigueros (1991) is the first thorough study of Mexican banking that addresses
the question of direct foreign competition. Its main results, using data from 1989, are
shown in figure 7 and table 1. The study's purpose is to describe the industry's
structure. It includes comparative measures of profitability, costs and their main
components. Solís-Trigueros (1991) claims that the legal framework is the only barrier
for entry and mobility.
[Insert figure 7, table 1]
This study includes participants' assessments: managers of 15 of the 18 commercial
banks were interviewed. However, no details are given regarding the research design
of the interview process. The results of the latter are reproduced in table 2 and are an
attempt to confirm the categories in Solís-Trigueros' (1991) statistical analysis: import
of services, foreign direct investment, services where locals seem to have a competitive
advantage, infrastructure and personnel quality.
[Insert table 2]
Besides the interview, Solís-Trigueros (1991) contribution is estimating banking
performance through the Herfindal-Hirschman index (HHI). The latter is defined as the
sum of the squares of incumbents' market share (for an account of the trade-offs
between concentration measures see Davies, 1988). Implicit in this approach is the
perception that the maximum level of efficiency is achieved when the market is "full"
i.e. there is no room for further entry. Even more, that this perfect competition is only
reached by a "great" number of firms. In other words, a single producer (monopoly) or
consumer (monopsony) is considered the most inefficient (greatest social cost
producing) form for market structure. Actually, by using HHI and through their
arguments Solís-Trigueros (1991:95) describe the classical hypothesis of SCP.
On the other hand, a second set of contributions are the studies edited by Federico
Rubli and Benito Solís (González, 1992; Monte, 1992; Morales-Galicia, 1992a,b;
Morales-Martínez,1992; and Rubli, 1992). When published, Nafta was half way
through the negotiations. The studies pay special attention to the European experience
concerning the integration of financial system. Specifically, the Spanish experience is19
claimed to be a good reference to discuss Nafta's effects:  The Spanish experience in
financial opening to foreign banks shows some characteristics that could be useful
when analyzing the form and convenience of the Mexican financial system's opening
to such competitors (Montes, 1992:284).
These studies attempt to describe Europe's financial integration. They also include a
discussion of the Free Trade Agreement between the US and Canada (Morales-
Galicia,1992a). More than analyzing the effects of the Single Market, they try to
envision where the process' benefits and cost will arise. However, a guiding principle is
that the transformation of the European market (and hence, the North American)
should be assessed through the theory of contestable markets (CMT). These studies
consider that Mexican financial markets were at the time potentialy contestable
markets. However, and regardless of the effectiveness of regulation policy, sunk costs
may prevent a significant change banking competitiveness.
As for its purpose of evaluating the European experience, these offer little but
descriptive evidence compared to the thorough analysis of  Neven (1990) and Vives
(1991) or the accounts of participants' expectations in Hawawini-Rajendra (1990),
Bryan (1993) and  Pacitti (1994), among others.
5.3 NAFTA-RELATED STUDIES
The studies in these sub-section assess Nafta's negotiation on financial services. The
first considered is Gavito-Sánchez-Trigueros (1992), which builds upon Solís-
Trigueros (1991). Its purpose is identifying where and how Mexican banks can benefit
from the agreement.  This is done in two steps: a)  depicting the relative efficiency and
structure of the banking system (the study's results are reproduced in table 3);  and b)
offering alternative policies that would ensure greater efficiency in the industry. It
draws four very important conclusions:
1. The structural characteristics, shown in table 3,  suggest that commercial banks'
prices are relatively high. Such prices are measured by financial margin and
commissions (p. 224).
2. Accounting practices (especially regarding off-balance-sheet transactions) and
lines of business do not allow a thorough comparison between the banking
industries in the three countries (pp.224, 226).20
3. The Mexican financial system is highly concentrated. The creation of financial
groups could make things worse. If this situation does not necessarily create an
uncompetitive market structure, it does help collusive arrangements (p. 229).
4. The best possible agreement would allow a gradual opening program which, in
turn, ought to incentive speedy reorganization, learning, and investment processes
by acting as a threat of future competition (pp. 234,45).
[Insert table 3]
Points 3 and 4 suggest that Gavito-Sánchez-Trigueros (1992) support CMT. As
mentioned, it's methodology proceeds in two steps. First, establishing the cost function
of a typical firm (minimum efficient scale, MES) and then calculating how many similar
establishments will produce the competitive output.
The second step, investigates which market pressures will lead towards such efficient
structure. In this sense, Gavito-Sánchez-Trigueros (1992:229) use an estimate of
American depository institutions to claim that the capital requirement to enter the
Mexican market is about 2.5 times the industry's MES. However, the difficulties in
making direct comparisons between Mexican and American banks have already been
noted in point 2 above. Therefore, the Mexican MES must be estimated. A feasible
research design is based on the efficiency of Spain's building societies (cajas de ahorro)
as suggested by Grifell-Prior-Salas (1992): A hypothetical production function is built
by combining the most efficient firms. Then, inefficiency is estimated as the
(orthogonal) distance of  specific firms (or group of establishments) from the efficiency
frontier. This approach also allows to test such distance for the average branch size
and average deposit.
The study of Grifell-Prior-Salas (1992) claims that technical and allocative efficiency
are more important to determine a bank's behavior than economies of scale or scope.
There are at least two limits regarding this procedure. First, one explicitly stated by the
authors. The study recognizes that in a multi-dimensional space "distance" is a relative
concept, subject to the researcher's specification. But, second, it does not take into
account that the efficiency frontier is defined in terms of the incumbent firms. That is, it
cannot be modified to accommodate alternative industry arrangements (i.e. price or
production vectors).21
For example, a research design under this approach should recognize the differences in
geographical extension and line of business of Mexican banks. Otherwise, it would be
liable of applying the right solution to the wrong question (see further Billinton 1983;
or Morris, 1984 on the spatial problems of policy implementation for multi-regional
banks in the US).
In brief, the MES of the Mexican banking system must be estimated. Once available
can be used to estimate how big a barrier are capital requirements. Note, however, that
this approach cannot consider production functions different from the ones used by
incumbents when, as mentioned above, technological change has been a key feature for
banking in recent years.
On the other hand, by examining Nafta's final draft (see Ortíz, 1993 or Serra, 1993) the
reader will observe that Gavito-Sánchez-Trigueros' (1992) point 4 is very similar to the
actual agreement. Indeed, Gavito-Trigueros (1994) claim that even though Nafta's
conditions are in the expected direction, the measures' "degree of liberalization" is
disappointing. The study supports its thesis by examining three aspects of the Mexican
banking system: financial deepening, the transformation of saving in investment, and
the costs of the latter process. However, the study takes the stand of classical SCP in
discussion of the second element: Several performance measurements are used to
analyze the efficiency of a banking system, other indexes such as the degree of
concentration or monopoly power may also be used, since they reflect the system's
efficiency. In the case of the Mexican banks several authors (Chávez 1983 [sic] and
Sánchez 1993) have established that there is a high degree of concentration and
certain [amount of] monopoly power therefore the present study will focus to the
performance of indexes obtained from the profit and loss statements (p. 195, ellipsis
not in original).
[Insert table 4 and 5]
The study's results, highlighted in tables 4 and 5, present the above mentioned indexes
comparing different countries and their development through time (1988 to 1992). The
authors acknowledge the analysis is limited because of differences in accounting
practices, line of business mixture, legal frameworks, capital requirements and cross-
subsidies. In any case, it concludes that the Mexican banking system is less competitive
than its closest and most relevant counterparts, that its operation costs and financial
margins should decrease to become more competitive and, above all, to offer better22
services to consumers and the productive sector (see further Gavito-Trigueros,
1994:205-6 or Negrete-Cornejo, 1993).
Based on the American S&L debacle Gavito-Trigueros (1994:223) claim that the
Mexican adjustment process will take around 3 years for banks to reach international
standards. Therefore, this study answers with factual information the key question for
CMT. One method to address this thoroughly is devised by Schaffer (1993). This study
claims to have calculated, in previous contributions, the time required for the US and
Canadian industries to recover equilibrium after their respective regulation policy
programs (in the early 1980's). Note that, according to Schmalensee (1989:997), entry
speed assessment should consider both local and foreign firms. Also, that empirical
evidence suggests foreign firms usually take greater advantage of market growth.
Schaffer (1993) estimates a market power index aided by a two stage least square
regression (of accounting information). The resulting parameters measure the degree
by which the average establishment's marginal income deviates from the demand
schedule i.e. the presence of above normal economic profits or the major incentives for
entry.
Schaffer (1993) is one of the types of CMT-oriented study on the analysis of
accounting information or stocks' rate of return (other examples are Geroski-Masson-
Shaanan, 1987; Goldberg, 1993; Molyneux et al., 1994; Dickens-Philipatos,1994).
Most of these research specimens estimate the kindness of either an index (Panzar-
Russel's H or market power, for example) or a break in the regression's slope (whose
sign or expected change falsifies a contestability based hypothesis). Schaffer (1993)
belongs to this second group, because it tries to test an index's change in slope.
In general, both groups of studies use time series and cross-sectional studies,
performed over single (local) or multiple banking industries (international). However,
none was found to be employing panel-data techniques or explicitly addressing the
questions of markets in disequilibrium. It is worth noting that these studies have been
criticized for using unfit information to measure industry specifications.
In summary, the research reviewed in this section details the  Mexican banking system.
Empirical evidence is reproduced in order to show that the discussion of the industry's
structure has been made in terms of banks' prices performance (as measured by
financial margins, commission income and profitability). These studies also prove
useful to enlighten the theoretical approaches previously discussed, as well as the23
suitability of these theories to act as a framework for banks’ corporate strategy.
However, relevant elements concerning entry are not properly dealt with. Specially, the
efficiency of policy reform against the speed of entry or market growth. To the
endeavor of finding a suitable approach, the discussion now turns.
6 TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 SUMMARY
This paper argues that CMT is an adequate approach to build the corporate strategy of
Mexican banks, because it deals directly with the questions roused regarding regulation
policy of  financial services. With the concept of entry deterrence in mind, the essay
also discusses those areas that most urgently need to be addressed to assess the
contestability of the Mexican banking system. Succinctly they were:
1. Strategic Groups (Networks).
2. Branch web density.
3. Minimum Efficient Scale.
4. Analysis of accounting data and stock price's returns.
5. Market growth.
The essay also argued that  the last two points are the most urgent concepts to be
addressed to cover the immediate necessities of Mexican banks’ corporate strategy.
What follows is, then, a research proposal to cover this necessity. This proposal
presents a model that envisions market growth and complies with the requirements
previously discussed.
A type of study missing in the literature concerning the Mexican case and the
international discussion, is a model that approaches market entry without losing sight
of the macroeconomic effects of financial intermediation. A rough draft of such a
model is the frame of reference of this essay (the PH model). It still lacks a precise
transfer function (that is, empirical form).  The PH model recognizes many aspects of
today's financial intermediation like the ability to test classical SCP or out-performing
some credit-rationing models (see Bhattacharya-Thakor, 1993; Hannan, 1991b; and24
Bátiz, 1994b). In the present state, this model envisions market growth of commercial
banking closely tied to that of the economy.
An empirical panel-data model inspired in Schaffer (1993), which considers individual
accounting information as suggested by equation (7), will out-perform other
techniques and CMT-based studies. This because that specification will allow
measurements of long-term trends, in markets in disequilibrium and "free" of
multicollinearity. However, this approach has several draw-backs. The most important
is that of market size, for example, there are 18 institutions in Mexico, 15 in Spain and
9 in the UK. The lack of degrees of freedom made the study likelier to succeed in an
environment similar to that of the US (where there are many more participants or
regulation policy was further away in time). A second crucial feature was, as has been
argued along this essay, that structure-conduct-performance relationships in banking
are multidimensional and simultaneously determined.
Therefore, this essay claims that CMT and banks’ corporate strategy will improved by
considering the concept of threat of entry (or the state where prices are sustainable
only if it is financially impossible for entrants to profit after covering the cost of entry)
as a contingent claim of incumbents over the growth of the market. Call this new
concept entry options: new entry will take place when potential entrants consider this
state (or slide or the industry pie) a call option  priced in- or at-the money.  The result
of entry deterrence will be pricing the option out-of-the money, while effective
regulation policy will increase the option's short term volatility.
However, the current problem to operationalise entry options is that there is not an
unequivocal relationship between financial services' quantities and prices or equity
capital (because of economies of scope). Furthermore, bank's capital does not respond
to a single interest rate but to a compound rate based on a portfolio of loans, deposits
and non-interest income. Industry wide applications of entry options require, therefore,
non-public information.
Nonetheless, if that information was available or a proxy found a bank (or a set of
banks) could be modeled as an option-portfolio where non-interest income will be
represented by calls, loans as "bull spreads" and deposit protection as a protective put.
Then, the portfolio of potential banking services (that is, those external growth
opportunities created by effective regulation policy) could be priced, for example, as a
barrier option approaching or distancing the level of government intervention. This
"exotic" option would be sold by regulators to incumbents and potential entrants or
traded between the last two.25
In summary, this section demonstrated that the character of  today's banking industry is
producing bundles of services. The actual values of the latter are established
simultaneously with decisions regarding structure, performance and the possibility of
foreign entry. Furthermore, as a conclusion to the review the essay proposed  a
multiple case-study of international banks' strategies and behavior after regulation
policy to produce a working framework to implement  entry options.
6.2 CODA
Finally, a word of auto-criticism and about long-term research. The reader will note
that this essay has 4 basic assumptions. First, the discussion supposes that the
economic role of commercial banks has not changed in the last 15 years. Second, that
during that same period technological change and, in practice, innovations in
telecommunications have had secondary importance in shaping the banking industry.
Third, that there are no systemic effects in banking other that “bank runs” (that is, they
are no longer needed for the control of the money supply). Fourth, that most financial
intermediation services are delivered through banks because these firms are superior
forms to manage information asymmetries and production shocks.
The second basic assumption will play a very important role in the design of banks
corporate strategy during the 1990s. Indeed, together with regulation policy
innovations in telecommunications reflect the change in the economic role of
commercial banks. Succinctly, they have produced not only participants with different
cost structures, but also allowed effective competitive pressures from non-bank and
non-financial intermediaries as well as turned commercial banks from intermediaries to
providers of financial information.
This phenomena, in turn, has created a need to design dynamic frameworks that enable
bank managers greater to control of the destiny of their firm. Managers will achieve
this control, primarily, through the development of internal resources (such as
managerial skills, innovation and firm specific assets).
It is expected that applications of capital budgeting schemes based on Option Pricing
Theory (such as entry options), which emphasize the time dependence of growth
opportunities as well as accommodate the interaction between internal and external
opportunities, will provide some answers.26
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this essay is to select the best framework to asses the effect regulation
policy has on banks' corporate strategy. The review of competing hypothesis finds
Contestable Market Theory the most suitable vehicle to perform that assessment. The
Mexican case illustrates empirical applications. The paper’s contribution is pointing out
the areas most needed of attention. Succinctly these are, first, unsolved questions
regarding the application of SCP's hypothesis in banking studies. Second, forthcoming
empirical research should establish the gains in banks' efficiency after successful
regulation policy. This second problem, it's suggested, could be approach through
panel data analysis. However, both Contestable Market Theory and banks' strategy
could dramatically improve by incorporating recent developments in Option Pricing
Theory.31
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